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The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement 
Procedures and Respect for the Rule of Law 
Aj; T H O M A S B U E R G E N T H A L * 
IT IS truly a great pleasure for me to be here with you this evening. I must admit, 
however, that I feel a little bit like the lawyer who comes home late one evening 
totally drunk. His wife meets him at the door and screams, 'what have you to say 
for yourself?' He looks at her in total innocence and mumbles: 'I don't really have 
anything to say, but I would be pleased to entertain questions'. 
Unlike the lawyer in this story, I attribute my problem not to alcohol but to the 
topic assigned to me, 'The proliferation of disputes, dispute setdement procedures 
and respect for the rule of law'. Your colloquium organisers very kindly gave me 
this broad topic to allow me to speak about anything I wanted to, and for that I 
am most grateful. But, of course, this broad topic creates its own problem: what 
specifically to speak about. 
Clearly, we have been witnessing a proliferation of disputes as well as a 
proliferation of dispute settlement procedures. I doubt, though, that respect for 
the rule of law has kept up with the proliferation of disputes and dispute 
settlement procedures, and I will have something to say on this subject in a 
moment, but let me first say a word about the proliferation of disputes and 
dispute settlement mechanisms. 
A story frequently told in American law schools runs something like this: a 
young lawyer moves into a small town that has not had a local lawyer for some 
years. The newcomer figures that he will become rich fast since he will get all 
local legal business. But contrary to his expectations, he is not doing very well and 
is ready to move to a larger city. But then another lawyer moves into town and 
both lawyers begin to prosper. Well, the moral of the story is that competing law 
firms create their own business dynamic or that more lawyers create more legal 
problems. 
Something like this same dynamic accounts for the proliferation of disputes 
and dispute setdement mechanisms. Of course, I am simplifying. Clearly, the 
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growth of international travel, trade and communication, as well as globalisation 
in general, account in large measure for more disputes, whereas the need to 
resolve these disputes peacefully quite naturally leads to an increase in the 
number and types of dispute settlement procedures. Other relevant phenomena 
are the proliferation of international organisations that have sprung up since the 
Second World War as well as the internationalisation of the protection of human 
rights. 
The human rights movement, for example, has led to the enactment of a large 
body of international human rights law, followed by the creation of judicial and 
quasi-judicial universal and regional institutions to resolve human rights disputes. 
This development has contributed to the growth of dispute setdement 
mechanisms not only in the human rights field, but in other areas of the law as 
well. I would guess, for example, that it helped the World Bank, when creating 
ICSID, that the practice of the European Commission and Court of Human 
Rights demonstrated early on that giving individuals standing to sue states did not 
have catastrophic consequences. Here it is also interesting to note that some of 
the reasons that motivated the creation of ICSID, including discriminatory 
governmental practices and laws, denials of due process, lengthy delays, 
corruption, etc., were not all that far removed from the problems that the 
European Convention on Human Rights was designed to address in the human 
rights context. 
Of course, there are many other reasons for the proliferation of dispute 
resolution procedures and the growing resort to them by states. Europe has 
pioneered with the European Convention on Human Rights and its dispute 
settlement procedures. They were followed by the establishment of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the African human rights system with its 
recently created African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights. Regional common 
market or economic courts have sprung up in different parts of the world, 
modelled on the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
As I look at these and similar developments, I have the impression that at least 
two different phenomena are at work here. In the past, states were afraid of 
international courts and tribunals. These fears could be attributed in part at least 
to the relatively small volume of international legislation and jurisprudence on 
almost any international law subject. That, in turn, made it difficult for states to 
predict judicial outcomes of disputes with any degree of certainty. Over the years, 
that jurisprudence has grown significantly as a result of the increase in the 
number of international judicial institutions and the resultant growth of their case 
law. I think, for example, that while the end of the Cold War has had much to do 
with the increase in the caseload of the International Court of Justice, if only 
because states now have greater confidence in the impartiality of the judges, it 
may also be true that the Court's expanded docket is due in part to the greater 
predictability regarding the law the Court will apply to a given dispute. That 
predictability is the result of the Court's growing jurisprudence. In other words, 
more cases produce more jurisprudence, more jurisprudence produces more 
cases. What we have here is the chicken and the egg phenomenon. 
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One other reason for the growth of dispute resolution mechanisms on the 
international plane has to do with what I would call the copy-cat factor. The 
success or notoriety of a dispute settlement mechanism established in one region 
of the world or by one international organisation, for example, will frequentiy 
lead to the creation of similar institutions in other parts of the world or within the 
framework of other international organisations. The driving force behind the 
copy-cat phenomenon tends usually to be the prestige of having such institutions 
because other more developed or more important regions have them. The 
phenomenon is also in evidence in the growing number of arbitral facilities being 
created in different parts of the world. Of course, they are also seen as money-
making institutions. 
Some have argued that the proliferation of dispute resolution mechanisms, 
particularly of universal and regional judicial institutions, may lead to the 
fragmentation of international law. I don't want to get into this controversial 
subject other than to note that I have argued elsewhere that the proliferation of 
international courts is, on the whole, good for international law. My simplistic 
view on this subject is that the growth of international judicial and quasi-judicial 
dispute mechanisms, particularly courts, whether regional or universal, leads to a 
creative interaction among such courts, helping to transform international law 
into a more vibrant and more relevant legal system than it has been in the past. 
I grant, of course, that there may be some fragmentation, but that is unavoidable 
and inherent in the interpretation or application of legal norms by different 
courts to different problems and at times even to the same problems. In this 
connection, I wonder whether fragmentation is the right word to describe this 
phenomenon. Might one not speak instead of the growing inclusiveness of 
international law or the broadening of the concept of international law? 
Just one more word on this issue. I have long been fascinated by overt and 
covert interaction between international courts. There are very few ICSID 
tribunals, for example, that do not cite decisions of the International Court of 
Justice. When I was on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, we looked to 
and often cited decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the ICJ as 
well as the PCIJ. I can also assure you that the judges of the ICJ study the 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights as well as the decisions of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia when they might be 
relevant to our work. In short, there is a great deal of interaction between 
international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. That is good and there should be 
more of it. Informal contacts between the various courts should also be encouraged. 
I turn to respect for the rule of law in the context of the proliferation of 
international disputes and international dispute setdement procedures. Here I 
believe we still have a long way to go. There is much I could say on the subject, 
but I am well aware that a good meal, together with a long rambling speech, will 
put even the most conscientious audience to sleep. So I shall be brief and focus on 
some due process of law issues which to me are inherent elements of the rule of law. 
For example, I believe that insufficient attention is being paid to some conflict 
of interest issues that can arise in the selection of those who are called upon to 
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settle disputes. Let me illustrate my point by reference to ICSID, since it is the 
arbitration facility I am most familiar with. I have long believed that the practice 
of allowing arbitrators to serve as counsel, and counsel to serve as arbitrators, 
raises due process of law issues. In my view, arbitrators and counsel should be 
required to decide to be one or the other, and be held to the choice they have 
made, at least for a specific period of time. That is necessary, in my opinion, in 
order to ensure that an arbitrator will not be tempted, consciously or 
unconsciously, to seek to obtain a result in an arbitral decision that might advance 
the interests of a client in a case he or she is handling as counsel. ICSID is 
particularly vulnerable to this problem because the interpretation and application 
of the same or similar legal instruments (the bilateral investment treaties, for 
example) are regularly at issue in different cases before it. 
I also believe that repeated designations by counsel of the same arbitrator 
should be avoided. These revolving-door problems — counsel selecting an 
arbitrator who, the next time around when the arbitrator is counsel, selects the 
previous counsel as arbitrator — should be avoided. Manus manum lavat, in other 
words 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours', does not advance the rule of 
law. 
Next, I have serious doubts regarding the wisdom of perpetuating the system 
of ad hoc judges, which is the rule in the ICJ and some other international 
tribunals. If you look at the separate opinions of ad hoc judges, you will rarely 
find any of them voting against the state that designated them. A much fairer 
system, in my opinion, would be to require the sitting national judges not to 
participate in the proceedings in which their country is a party to a case before 
the court, thus doing away with the need for ad hoc judges. (This rule applies in 
the newly created African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights.) I recognise, of 
course, that ad hoc judges are supposed, inter alia, to help the court understand 
the national law of the country that has designated them. It is worth noting here 
that in the case of the ICJ, for example, or that of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, the tendency of states has been to name distinguished non-
nationals rather than their own nationals as ad hoc judges. That suggests to me 
that the real reason for the designation of the ad hoc judge is not to help the court 
understand some relevant aspect of national law. In the ICJ, moreover, national 
law is seldom a relevant issue. I also do not think that ad hoc judges are needed 
to ensure that the court fully understand the arguments made by counsel for the 
parties. That is the job of counsel. 
Further, having just gone through a re-election process, I am particularly 
conscious of the variety of problems the current system poses for judges seeking 
election or re-election to certain courts and tribunals, particularly within the 
United Nations system. What struck me in my re-election campaign is how highly 
politicised the election process is for the various judicial positions that the UN 
membership has to vote for and how little judicial qualifications of the individual 
candidates or their judicial record seem to matter. In my case, for example, one 
state very formally proposed to vote for me, provided the USA agreed to support 
that state's candidacy for a seat on the Security Council. I was honoured. 
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Another problem that will have to be addressed at some point, I believe, has to 
do with the pressure that judicial candidates wishing to be renominated are likely 
to experience when they have to vote in a case in which their state of nationality 
is a party. That is another reason why, as I indicated a minute ago, I would prefer 
for national judges not to participate in cases involving their own country. The 
problem might also be dealt with by limiting judges to one term only, possibly one 
longer single term. 
Finally, I also believe that there is a genuine need for the development and 
adoption of strict ethical standards applicable to judges and counsel in 
international tribunals. Existing standards are much too lax. They are even more 
difficult to enforce. The proliferation of international disputes and international 
dispute resolution mechanisms requires that the international community pay 
much closer attention than in the past to the ethical standards necessary to ensure 
that the rule of law is observed in the settlement of international disputes. 
There is much more to be said on all these subjects, but the time has come for 
me to stop talking. 
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